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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely re-
peated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a
common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic,
inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for communication in low
demand states. Therefore, partial communication in high demand states is suf-
ficient to achieve the most collusive, full communication outcome. And partial
communication in low demand state does not improve on the equilibrium without
communication. Communication in high demand states allows firms to coordinate
their pricing, choose the most efficient uninformed price and avoid price wars. I
demonstrate that under some conditions consumers are better off with communi-
cation among colluding firms.
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1 Introduction
The detection and prosecution of collusive agreements is the most daunting task of
competition policy. Taking collusion at face value, i.e. as market outcomes worse than
some competitive benchmark, competition authorities could in principle try to infer
collusion from price, quantity and cost data in a given industry. However, as several
authors recently argued, inferring collusion from market data is virtually impossible.1
In practice, the relevant market information is - for strategic or technical reasons - never
fully available to competition authorities. Moreover, quantitative studies of allegedly
collusive behavior have proven to be highly sensitive to the specification of the functional
forms of the empirical model and therefore not very useful in court.2 In some cases it
was pointed out that rather than looking at price levels an analysis of the evolution of
prices in an industry would reduce the data requirements. However, as evidenced in
the famous Wood Pulp case3, price parallelism is at most a necessary - not a sufficient -
condition for the existence of collusion.
Consequently, most competition authorities around the world have adopted the so-
called parallelism plus rule. This policy allows prosecution of collusive behavior only
in cases where well-founded suspicion can be supported by hard evidence of facilitating
practices like communication between firms, resale price maintenance or other institu-
tionalized market design features. In 1998 the European Commission detected the Lom-
bard Club cartel which involved eight Austrian banks in an extremely comprehensive
price-fixing scheme including banking products like interest rates, service fees, money
transfers as well as the degree of advertising.4 Meetings of the different cartel sub-
committees were often triggered by changes in macro-economic variables or the lending
rates by the Austrian Central Bank, whereupon the banks promptly met “for the joint
reflection of measures to be taken”. Eventually, simultaneous surprise inspections by
the Commission unearthed hundreds of documents – minutes of meetings, memoranda,
records of telephone conversations, correspondence. In 2002, the Commission imposed
fines totaling 124,26 million euros on the eight banks.
The advantage of the parallelism plus rule is that it is based on court-proof, hard
evidence. The downside is that its effectiveness crucially hinges on two factors. First,
the parallelism plus rule is unable to prosecute collusive outcomes that do not require
facilitating practices. And therefore, the less important facilitating practices are to
sustain collusion, the less effective is this policy. Second, competition authorities need
1These authors include Ku¨hn (2001), Motta (2004) and Rey (2003).
2An often cited example are the diametrically opposed conclusions based on the same data set of
the US railroad cartel in the 1880’s in Porter (1983) and Ellison (1994).
3Preparation of Wood Pulp, Case IV/29.725, L85/1, 26.3.85 ECJ Cases C-89, see Motta (2004) for
a comprehensive summary
4See the official press release IP-02-844 and the full decision COMP/36.571/D1 at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/
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to be able to observe the use of facilitating practices. While it seems less obvious to
detect information sharing or communication between firms, the Lombard Club case
and other recent high-profile cartel cases such as Citric Acids or Vitamins suggest that
communication typically leaves hard evidence that can potentially be seized.
In this paper I concentrate on the first condition and analyze the importance of
communication between firms for the sustainability of collusion. While there is some
consensus about the fact that communication facilitates collusion, the question here is
rather how much communication is actually needed and in which circumstances firms
have stronger incentives to communicate. To this end, I consider an infinitely repeated
Bertrand game with independent, common value demand fluctuations (low or high). At
the beginning of each period, each firm receives a private, independent (over time and
firms) signal about the current demand level which is either perfectly informative or not
informative at all. The resulting asymmetric information between firms implies that
firms do no longer agree on the most collusive industry price and have an incentive to
engage in communication. At the following communication stage, firms simultaneously
send messages to all other firms in the industry. Then firms set prices, the demand level
is disclosed and profits are realized. I analyze and compare symmetric perfect public
equilibria (SPPE) in three different modes of communication: no communication, full
communication (i.e. communication in all states of demand) and partial communication
(i.e. communication in one demand state only).
The unobservability of private signals introduces the possibility of opportunistic price
cuts in the sense that firms can deviate to prices that are assigned to different signal
types. These deviations are not detectable with probability one and impose additional
constraints on the optimal organization of collusion. Two such on-schedule deviations
have to be accounted for in this context: the deviation of a firm with an informative
signal that demand is high (low) to the equilibrium price for firms with an uninformative
signal.
The analysis of optimal collusion without communication among firms shows that the
most restrictive on-schedule constraint is the one that prevents firms with a high demand
signal to post the price of an uninformed firm. However, firms have three instruments to
relax this condition and the optimal organization of collusion trades off the benefits and
costs of these instruments. First, firms can impose price rigidity, i.e. they simply equate
the price for the two types in every period. Second, they can distort the uninformed price
downwards to make deviations less attractive. And thirdly, firms can start price wars
after price distributions they deem suspicious of on-schedule deviations. I show that if
firms are patient, the leverage of the price war threat is sufficiently strong such that firms
only rely on the latter two instruments. Firms optimally start price wars after observing
uniformed prices from all firms and distort the uninformed price downwards but always
above the low demand monopoly level. The on-schedule constraint for low demand
signal firms is never binding and the optimal organization of collusion approaches the
unconstrained maximum without communication if the discount factor goes to one.
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With full communication in low and high demand states the on-schedule constraints
are replaced by incentive constraints for communication. If it is in equilibrium incentive-
compatible to share all information at the communication stage, then at the pricing
stage, firms have common knowledge and any deviation is directly observable and punish-
able. Therefore, sufficiently patient firms can implement the same allocation a monopoly
(with all firms’ independent signals) could achieve.
More importantly, the analysis of partial communication then shows that firms can
replicate this first-best outcome under full communication with information sharing
in high demand states only. The argument to show this equivalence consists of two
steps. First, firms can use inter-temporal, stochastic market sharing as a substitute for
communication in low demand states. To see this, note that with communication in
low demand states, firms share the market evenly (at the monopoly price level) in every
low demand period in which a least one firm receives an informative signal. Without
communication, firms with an informative signal undercut their uninformed rivals (to the
monopoly price) and all informed firms share the whole market. However, since demand
levels and signals are uncorrelated across time and firms, firms have the same probability
of being in the winning fraction of firms in each period, i.e. without communication firms
share the market stochastically over time. The second part of the argument is to show
that the additional on-schedule constraint for low-demand signal firms is not binding in
the optimal price schedule.
A similar equivalence result obtains for partial communication in low demand states
only. Due to the possibility of stochastic market sharing, the most collusive equilibrium
with partial communication in low demand states cannot achieve higher industry profits
than collusion without communication.
Finally, I discuss the value of communication for firms and consumers. Stochastic
market sharing reduces all rents from communication in low demand states to zero. The
value of communication in high demand states can be decomposed in a coordination
effect, a price adjustment effect and the gain/loss from avoiding the on-schedule con-
straint. While for the firms all three effects are positive, for consumers only the first and
the third are negative, whereas the price adjustment effect is positive. I demonstrate
with an inelastic demand example that the price adjustment effect can indeed dominate
and that consumers might be better off if colluding firms communicate in high demand
states.
The basic set-up of this paper is based on the seminal work of Rotemberg & Saloner
(1986). They consider an industry with observable i.i.d. demand fluctuations and show
that the optimal collusive arrangement might involve counter-cyclical price movements.
Firms reduce the collusive price in high demand states to counterbalance the stronger
incentive to deviate for cartel member. In this paper, I replace the perfect public demand
signal with imperfect, independent, private signals and add a communication stage before
the pricing decisions. Therefore, my analysis is close to the work of Athey & Bagwell
(2001). Their paper considers a repeated game duopoly with inelastic demand in which
3
firms’ costs can either be high or low, with independent draws in each period. Each
firm knows its own cost realization but not the cost level of its rival. They find an
asymmetric perfect public equilibrium that implements first-best profits in which firms
communicate their cost level. Productive (firm) efficiency is achieved by allocating high
cost firms a higher future market share. In a similar set-up, Athey, Bagwell & Sanchirico
(2004) consider a continuum of cost types and show that the optimal SPPE sacrifices
productive efficiency by using a rigid, non-sorting price scheme in order to deter high-cost
firms from mimicking low-cost types. The present paper differs from these two seminal
contributions in at least two important ways. First, firms have private information
about a common demand shift and the same cost structure. Thus, the firms’ main
concern is to coordinate on allocative (firm) efficiency rather than productive efficiency.
And secondly, the main focus of this paper is how much communication is necessary to
achieve first-best, rather than whether communication can achieve maximum collusive
profits.
This paper is also related to the “moral hazard” literature of collusion following the
work of Stigler (1964) and Green & Porter (1984). As opposed to the “adverse selec-
tion” assumption in this paper, these authors consider situations in which symmetrically
informed firms are unable to perfectly observe the behavior of their rivals. If firms re-
ceive public signals generated by their price or output choices, the continuation play is
always an equilibrium of the repeated game and the dynamic programming technique
of Abreu, Pearce & Stacchetti (1986, 1990) and Fudenberg, Levine & Maskin (1994)
can be applied to establish folk theorems. If, by contrast, firms receive private signals,
this recursive structure is destroyed. In this context Kandori & Matsushima (1998)
and Compte (1998) stress the role of communication by generating publicly observable
history on which the continuation play can be conditioned. This recovers the recursive
structure and allows the proof of folk theorems.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model. The follow-
ing three sections analyze collusion without, with full and with partial communication.
Section 6 compares the results. Section 7 discusses an example and the last section
concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an infinitely repeated game with n ≥ 2 firms, labelled i ∈ N = {1, 2, ..n}.
Firms have constant marginal cost of production c > 0 and compete in prices in a
market for a homogenous good with stochastic demand. In any period demand is a
function of the market price p and an i.i.d. random variable θ ∈ {L,H} such that
D(p, θ) = Dθ(p) with DH(p) > DL(p) ≥ 0, ∀p. The probability of demand being in
state θ = H is given by Pr(θ = H) = ρ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.5 Denote monopoly profits in
5I shall refer to situations with ρ < (>)1/2 as demand with upward shocks (downward) shocks.
4
demand state θ as piθ(p) = (p − c)Dθ(p). I assume that Dθ(p) is twice differentiable,
downward sloping and not too convex to ensure concave monopoly profits. Furthermore,
I restrict attention to situations where the monopoly price, p∗θ, strictly increases with
the demand level, i.e.6
p∗H ≡ argmax piH(p) > p∗L ≡ argmax piL(p).
This assumption ensures that there is indeed a coordination problem between firms in
the sense that asymmetrically informed firms disagree over the most collusive price in
the industry.
At the beginning of each period, firm i receives a private signal si ∈ S ≡ {L,H, ø}
about the state of demand. A firm’s signal can either be perfectly informative or not
informative at all. The probability for firm i to learn the true state of demand θ ∈ {L,H}
is given by Pr{si = θ|θ} = σ and the probability of getting an uninformative signal in
demand state j is Pr{si = ø|θ} = 1 − σ. Firms’ signals are uncorrelated across firms
and independent over time. The parameter σ, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, measures the availability of
private demand information for firms.
After observing their private signal, firms communicate by simultaneously announc-
ing a message mi ∈M = {L,H, ø} to all other firms.7,8 The extent to which communica-
tion is possible is determined by the degree to which information is verifiable. I assume
that firm i with a signal si ∈ {L,H} can verifiably report this information to its rivals.
In other words, firms can prove that they received a high demand or low demand signal
but they cannot prove that they didn’t receive any information at all.9
Communication allows firms to update their belief bi defined as the probability that
firm i assigns to the event that demand is high, bi(si,m) = Pri{θ = H|{si,m}}. It will
be useful to refer to (si,m) as defining a private information state Ii of firm i. As a
function of their information state firms choose simultaneously prices (p1(I1)..pn(In)).
The strategy space of firm i for the stage game is given by
Ωi = {µi|µi : S →M} × {pi|pi : S ×M → <},
6In general, this assumption is satisfied in situations where an increase in demand does not add too
many high willingness-to-pay consumers relative to consumers with a lower willingness to pay, i.e. a
demand increase is not decreasing the demand slope by too much. Totally differentiating the first order
condition yields dp/dθ > 0 if ∂D(p, θ)/∂θ + (p − c)∂2D/(∂p∂θ) > 0. Thus, the assumption excludes
demand schedules where θ enters multiplicatively, θD(p) but allows additive formulations like θ+D(p).
7I prefer to interpret a ø-message as no communication between firms as the main focus of this
paper is to investigate the extent of communication which is both necessary to sustain collusion and
potentially detectable by competition authorities.
8Public communication between all industry members precludes the formation of information coali-
tions within the industry. Throughout the paper I restrict attention to the optimal organization of
collusion amongst all firms in the industry.
9The main results of the paper do not depend on this assumption. Cheap talk communication
imposes additional restrictions on the discount factor, i.e. the patience of firms, but does not affect the
optimal organization of collusion.
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and a given strategy ωi is specified as ωi = (µi(si), pi(si, µ)), a function that maps each
possible signal into a message and a function that maps the firm’s private signal and the
message vector into a price.
It is assumed that at equal prices firms evenly share demand. Thus, firm i’s ex post
profits for a given price vector p in demand state θ ∈ {L,H} are
pii(p, θ) =
{
0 if pi > p,
piθ(p)/m if pi = p.
where p is the lowest price charged by any firm, p ≡ mini{pi} and m is the number of
firms charging price p. For notational convenience define the interim profits of firm i at
the pricing stage, i.e. after receiving the private signal and messages, as
Πi(pi, Ii) ≡ E[pii(pi, p−i(I−i), Ii)].
The stage game is infinitely repeated creating a play sequence described by {θt, st, ωt}.
Firms discount future profits with a common discount factor δ and maximize the dis-
counted sum of the stage profits. At the end of each period, firms observe the price
charged by their rivals and the demand level. However, in the absence of a (verifiable)
informative message, it is impossible for a firm to infer their rivals’ demand signals.
Thus the game’s public history after period T comprises the demand levels, realized
messages and realized prices, i.e. hT = {θt,mt, pt}Tt=1, but not the private demand sig-
nals {st}. In order to obtain a recursive structure to the problem, I restrict my analysis
to symmetric perfect public equilibria (SPPE). A perfect public equilibrium is a Nash
equilibrium in public strategies, i.e. strategies in which firms condition on the public
history of the game but not on their own private history (Fudenberg, Levine & Maskin
(1994)). A public strategy for this repeated game maps the public history into the set of
stage game strategies Ωi. I further impose that firms use symmetric strategies ω in the
sense that firms with the same signal choose the same messages and firms in the same
information state set the same price. This implies that after each public history, the
continuation value of each firm is the same independent of their current period actions.10
3 Collusion without Communication
3.1 The Factored Interim Problem
I start by analyzing optimal collusion in the absence of communication between firms, i.e.
consider µi(si) = ø,∀si ∈ S, i ∈ N . On the equilibrium path, firm i’s information state
Ii at the price setting stage is uniquely determined by its private signal, i.e. Ii = si.
10Though restrictive, this assumption reflects situations in which asymmetric continuation values are
difficult to implement because future market share allocations might be costly to enforce.
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Consider symmetric price vectors pi(I) = pj(I) = p(I), i 6= j; i, j ∈ N and denote
Pr{x|n} the probability that x out of n firms are in information state Ii = ø. Then, for
p(ø) ≤ p(H), the ex ante expected profit of firm i in a high demand state can be written
as
Πøi (p|H) ≡ Pr{0|n}piH(p(H))/n+ (1− σ)
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}piH(p(ø))/(j + 1)
Similarly ex ante expected profits in a low demand state for p(L) ≤ p(ø) are
Πøi (p|L) ≡ Pr{n|n}piL(p(ø))/n+ σ
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}piL(p(L))/(n− j),
and firms maximize their overall profits EΠøi (p) ≡ ρΠøi (p|H) + (1− ρ)Πøi (p|L).
To find the most collusive SPPE, I recur to the recursive dynamic programming
technique developed by APS (1986, 1990). Any SPPE of the repeated game can be
decomposed into a pair of first period price schedules p(I) and continuation values
v(p, θ) that depend on the public history of the first period, i.e. realized prices and the
demand level. Conversely, in order for a decomposition pair (p(I), v(p, θ)) to qualify as
a SPPE two necessary and sufficient conditions have to hold. First, an individual firm
should have no incentive to deviate from the current period price schedule to a price
schedule p′(I) given all other firms choose p(I). And second, all continuation values
are drawn from the set of SPPE payoff values V ∗. Therefore, the firms’ maximization
problem can be written as
max
p(I),v(p,θ))
EΠøi (p) + δE[v(p, θ)] subject to
v(p, θ) ∈ V ∗,∀p (i)
EΠøi (p) + δE[v(p, θ)] ≥ EΠøi (p′, p) + δE[v(p′, p, θ)],∀p′ (ii)
The solution to this problem yields the highest possible value of V ∗, v ≡ supV ∗. Since
the perpetual repetition of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is always a SPPE,
the set V ∗ is non-empty and its lowest possible value is v ≡ 0. To convexify the set
V ∗ assume that firms have access to a public randomization device at the end of each
period. Then, the bang-bang property of optimal continuation values in an equilibrium
implies that the value of any SPPE (including the most collusive) can be sustained by
a SPPE which after every public history of the first period only uses the two extreme
continuation values v and v. In other words, the choice of optimal continuation values
can be reduced to assigning a probability β(p, θ) ∈ [0, 1] to every possible public history
after period 1 with which firms start a price war, i.e. they revert to the stage game Nash
equilibrium forever. With the remaining probability firms continue to play the current
period strategy.
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To be implementable, an equilibrium price vector has to resist three types of devia-
tions. First, a firm could choose to deviate off-schedule, i.e. to out-of-equilibrium prices
p′ /∈ p(I). These deviations are immediately detected by rivals and can be punished
with β(p′, θ) = 1. Thus it has to hold that, ∀p′ /∈ p(I), and ∀Ii ∈ S,
(1− δ)Πi(p(Ii), Ii) + δE[v(β(p(Ii), θ))] ≥ (1− δ)Πi(p′, Ii). (OFF)
Second, firms can deviate to prices that are not equilibrium prices with a strictly positive
probability, i.e. deviations that are partially off-schedule. More precisely, if a firm with
an uninformative signal deviates to the equilibrium price of a firm with an H(L)-signal,
it is found out and punished at the end of the period if demand is actually low or,
respectively, high. Therefore, it has to hold ∀θ′ ∈ {L,H} that
(1− δ)Πi(p(ø), ø) + δE[v(β(p(ø), θ))] ≥ (POF)
(1− δ)Πi(p(θ′), ø) + Pr{θ = θ′}δE[v(β(p(θ′), θ))].
Finally, a firm can deviate on-schedule by choosing p′ ∈ p(I|θ). In a SPPE without
communication between firms, there are two possible on-schedule deviations: a firm
with a H-signal or a firm with a L-signal could deviate to p(ø). At the end of the first
period, firms are never able to infer from the price distribution that with probability one
a rival has deviated on-schedule. Consequently, firms have to devise price schedules and
continuation values that are robust to on-schedule deviation incentives. A firm with a
demand signal θ ∈ {L,H} does not deviate if
(1− δ)Πi(p(θ), Ii = θ) + δE[v(β(p(θ), p−i, θ))] ≥ (OS-θ)
(1− δ)Πi(p(ø), Ii = θ) + δE[v(β(p(ø), p−i, θ))].
The firms’ maximization problem can therefore be rewritten as
max
p(I),β(p,θ)
EΠøi (p) + δE[v(β(p, θ))] subject to
0 ≤ β(p, θ) ≤ 1, ∀p, θ (i)
(OFF), (POF) and (OS-θ) (ii)
3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
I assume that firms are sufficiently patient such that off-schedule and partially off-
schedule deviations never occur and the constraints (OFF) and (POF) are not strictly
binding in equilibrium. I also drop the on-schedule constraint for L-signal firms, (OS-L)
and check that in the solution to this reduced maximization problem this constraint is
always satisfied.
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Firms have three different strategic options to satisfy the remaining constraint (OS-
H): price rigidity, price distortions and price wars. The on-schedule constraint is trivially
satisfied if firms impose price rigidity,
p(H) = p(ø). (OSH-0)
In order to discuss the two other instruments note that, since (OFF) and (POF) are
assumed to be satisfied, the public history after the current period can be summarized by
the number of firms posting the uninformed price p(ø). Thus, for notational convenience,
denote βj the probability of a price war after a period of high demand with j firms posting
price p(ø). Then, for p(ø) < p(H), (OS-H) can be rewritten as
σn−1piH(p(H))/n+
δ
1− δ
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}(1− βj)EΠøi (p) ≥
1− σn
1− σ pi
H(p(ø))/n+
δ
1− δ
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}(1− βj+1)EΠøi (p)
or, adding the sums and re-arranging, (OSH-1),
δ
1− δ
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}(βj+1 − βj)EΠøi (p) ≥
1− σn
n(1− σ)pi
H(p(ø))− σ
n−1
n
piH(p(H)).
The right-hand side (’RHS’) of this condition is the expected gain in current period
profits from deviating to p(ø) instead of playing the equilibrium price p(H). A deviating
firm undercuts all firms receiving a H-signal and shares the market (at the lower price
p(ø)) with as many firms as receive an uninformative signal.11 The equilibrium strategy
only returns strictly positive profits if all other n − 1 firms also receive an informative
signal. Note that the RHS is always positive at p(H) = p(ø) but decreases the further the
uninformed price is reduced away from the high demand monopoly price. In other words,
downward price distortions of the uninformed price relax the on-schedule constraint. The
left-hand side (’LHS’) is the difference in the price war probabilities from playing the
equilibrium price versus deviating to p(ø) times the maximum continuation value. Thus,
firms can devise a price war vector β that punishes price distributions that are more
likely to be generated by a deviating firm. Finally note that the uninformed price also
enters the LHS. The more the uninformed price is distorted away from the maximizer
of EΠøi (p), the less damaging and therefore effective are price wars.
11The first term on the right-hand side is obtained from simplifying
∑n−1
j=0 Pr{j|n−1}piH(p(ø))/(j+1)
using the Binomial Theorem.
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3.2.1 Unconstrained solution
As a benchmark consider the conditions under which the unconstrained solution satisfies
the on-schedule constraint.
Lemma 1 The unconstrained solution p∗(I) = (p∗L, p∗(ø), p∗H) where p∗(ø) is implicitly
defined by
(1− ρ)(1− σ)n∂pi
L(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
+ ρ(1− σn)∂pi
H(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
= 0 (1)
obtains if
piH(p∗(ø))
piH(p∗H)
≤ σ
n−1 − σn
1− σn . (2)
It follows directly from (1), the concavity of the profit functions and p∗L < p
∗
H that
the optimal price increases in the firms’ demand signal. In particular, firms with a
L-signal optimally set the low demand monopoly price and undercut all firms with an
uninformative signal. This means that in a low demand period some firms make zero
profits while the remaining firms share the market equally at the most collusive price.
Similarly, firms with a H-signal set the high demand monopoly price but only make
positive profits if no rival received an uninformative signal. Finally, the uninformed
price p(ø) is determined by weighing the marginal profits of high and low demand with
the respective probability that p(ø) is the industry price in these demand states. In low
demand states, the uninformed price becomes effective if no firm receives an informative
signal while in high demand states the uninformed price is chosen if at least one firm
receives an uninformative signal. Thus, intuitively, the uninformed price increases in ρ
and n and decreases in σ.12
The unconstrained solution is the global maximizer if p∗(I) satisfies (OSH-1) without
the use of (costly) price wars, i.e. for βi = 0,∀i. This holds if the quotient of high demand
profits with the uninformed price to high demand monopoly profits is sufficiently low.
The RHS of (2) increases in σ, decreases in n and is smaller than σ/(1 + σ) (and
therefore always smaller than 1/2). Therefore, together with the comparative statics
of the uninformed price, the unconstrained solution is more likely to be satisfied in
parameter constellations with ρ and n small and σ large.
3.2.2 Price rigidity
If the unconstrained solution fails to hold, firms can recur to price rigidity to satisfy the
on-schedule constraint. The following lemma gives the solution of maximizing the ex
ante expected profits subject to (OSH-0).
12Taking the total differential of (1) yields that dp∗(ø)/dσ<0 if n(1 − ρ)(1 − σ)n−1(∂piL/∂p) −
ρnσn−1(∂piH/∂p)<0. Similarly, (dp∗(ø)/dn)>0 if (1 − ρ)(1 − σ)n log(1 − σ)(∂piL/∂p) −
ρσn log(σ)(∂piH/∂p)>0. Since ∂piL(p∗(ø))/∂p∗(ø)<0 and ∂piH(p∗(ø))/∂p∗(ø)>0 both inequalities hold.
10
Lemma 2 If (OSH-0) is strictly binding, the solution to the maximization problem is
given by p(I) = (p∗L, pr, pr) where pr is implicitly defined by
(1− ρ)(1− σ)n∂Π
L(pr)
∂pr
+ ρ
∂ΠH(pr)
∂pr
= 0. (3)
It follows directly from comparing (1) and (3) that the optimal rigid price pr is higher
than the uninformed price in the unconstrained solution but lower than the high de-
mand monopoly price. Thus, ex post prices might be higher or lower compared to the
unconstrained solution. Imposing the same price for uninformed firms and firms with a
high demand signal eliminates the possibility of opportunistic price cuts for the latter.
However, this solution comes at the cost of ignoring high demand signals and thereby
giving up informational rents in every period. Note that the existence of this rigid price
solution is independent of the discount factor and therefore a candidate global maximizer
for all values of δ as long as (2) fails to hold.
3.2.3 Price distortions and price wars
First consider the optimal use of price wars for a given price vector. A marginal increase
of the probability βj of a price war after a price distribution with j uninformed prices has
two opposing effects on the LHS of (OSH-1). It decreases the equilibrium continuation
value for a H-signal firm by the probability that j out of the remaining n−1 firms receive
an uninformative signal. At the same time the continuation value after a deviation to
p(ø) decreases by the probability that j − 1 out of the remaining n− 1 firms receive an
uninformative signal. Thus, the overall effect of increasing the price war probability on
incentive compatibility is positive if only if the probability of facing j − 1 uninformed
rivals is higher than facing j uninformed rivals, or Pr{j − 1|n − 1} > Pr{j|n − 1}.
This potential gain in relaxing the on-schedule constraint has to be traded off with the
expected loss in ex ante profits through a marginally more likely price war if in a high
demand period j out of n firms receive an uninformative signal. The following likelihood
ratio gives the expected marginal loss in return for marginally relaxing the on-schedule
constraint,
Γ(j) ≡ ρPr{j|n}
Pr{j − 1|n− 1} − Pr{j|n− 1} .
Denote λ the Lagrange multiplier of the on-schedule constraint.
Lemma 3 If (OSH-1) is strictly binding, then the optimal price war strategy can be
characterized as follows:
(i) If Γ(j) < λ < Γ(j − 1), then βi = 0, ∀i, 0 ≤ i < j and βi = 1, ∀i, j ≤ i ≤ n.
(ii) If λ = Γ(j), then βj ∈ [0, 1], βi = 0, ∀i, 0 ≤ i < j and βi = 1, ∀i, j < i ≤ n.
(iii) If 0 < λ < Γ(n) = ρ(1− σ), then βj = 0, ∀j, 0 ≤ j ≤ n.
(iv) βj = 0 for j ≤ n(1− σ).
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Lemma 3 states that for a given shadow price of the on-schedule constraint, it is optimal
to start a price war with probability 1 for all numbers of uninformed prices above a
certain threshold and not to have any price wars for lower numbers. The reason for
this is that the marginal loss per unit of relaxed on-schedule constraint, i.e. Γ(j), is
decreasing in the number of uninformed equilibrium prices. Thus, if the shadow price
λ is higher than the likelihood ratio for some j it is always beneficial to increase the
price war probability for all i > j. Point (i) and (ii) in Lemma 3 apply this idea to two
different cases. If the shadow price is identical to the likelihood ratio of the threshold
number of uninformed prices, an interior solution βj ∈ [0, 1] obtains; if it is higher a
corner solution with βj = 1 holds. Point (iii) states that if the shadow price is below the
ex ante probability that a firm remains uninformed in a high demand state, then firms do
not use price wars and only rely on price distortions to satisfy the on-schedule constraint.
Price wars relax the on-schedule constraint only if the denominator of Γ(j) is positive.
As point (iv) shows, this is true for all j larger than the maximum likelihood estimate
of the number of uninformed signals with n firms which is n(1− σ). Consequently, Γ(j)
goes to infinity as j approaches n(1 − σ) and it is - independent of the shadow price
- never optimal to start a price war if no more than n(1 − σ) uninformed prices are
observed.
The next step is to analyze the optimal pricing behavior for a given λ and the
corresponding optimal price war behavior. While at this point the model in its general
form becomes intractable for most parameter constellations, it is possible to characterize
the solution if firms are sufficiently patient.
Lemma 4 Suppose (2) fails to hold. Then there exists a δ˜ < 1 such that for all δ ≥ δ˜
the unique solution to the reduced maximization problem is characterized by
(i) βj = 0, ∀j < n, and 0 ≤ βn ≤ 1,
(ii) p(I) = (p∗L, p∗∗(ø), p∗H) with p∗L < p∗∗(ø) < p∗(ø),
(iii) for δ → 1: p∗∗(ø)→ p∗(ø) and βn → 0,
(iv) (OS-L) is slack.
For sufficiently patient firms price wars have a strong leverage to relax the on-schedule
constraint. In particular, there exists a threshold value on the discount factor above
which price wars only need to be triggered with a positive probability after n uninformed
prices are observed (point (i)). The optimal degree of downward price distortion takes
into account the two effects the uninformed price has on the on-schedule constraint. De-
creasing p(ø) away from the high demand monopoly level relaxes (OSH-1) while moving
away from the level of the unconstrained solution p∗(ø) reduces the maximum continu-
ation value and thereby makes price wars a less severe punishment. From this follows
that the optimal uninformed price is always below the level of the unconstrained solution
(point (ii)).
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If firms are more patient, the price war threat becomes even stronger and the optimal
price war probability approaches zero as the discount factor goes towards one. At the
same the cost of distorting the maximal continuation value is increasing and the optimal
uninformed price approaches the level of the unconstrained solution (point (iii)). The
last point in the above lemma justifies our initial omission of the on-schedule constraint
for low demand signal firms. The leverage of price wars allows firms to sustain an
uninformed price strictly above the low demand monopoly level. And since a firm with
a L-signal would never find it optimal to deviate upwards losing its expected share of
monopoly profits for a less likely share of smaller industry profits, (OS-L) is not binding.
It is now straightforward to establish the optimal collusion scheme for patient firms
without communication.
Proposition 1 Suppose δ is sufficiently close to 1. If (2) holds, the most collusive
SPPE without communication is given by Lemma 1. Otherwise, the most collusive SPPE
is given by Lemma 4.
As demonstrated in Lemma 4 the use of price wars allows firms to approach the uncon-
strained maximum when the discount factor goes to one. Therefore, there must exist a
threshold value for δ above which the price war solution dominates price rigidity. Intu-
itively, price rigidity ensures incentive compatibility by distorting profits in the current
and all future periods whereas price wars and price distortions make relatively more use
of future continuation profits. Hence, the relative power of price wars as an incentive
mechanism is stronger the more patient firms are.
4 Collusion with Full Communication
In this section I consider equilibria in which firms communicate all information they
receive, i.e. µi(si) = si,∀si ∈ S. Based on their own signal and the messages received
from their competitors, firms update their beliefs about the state of demand. In particu-
lar, after the communication stage, firms are in one of three possible information states.
With an ex ante probability of 1 − (1 − σ)n, at least one firm receives an informative
signal and sends a message to the other firms. Firms have perfect common knowledge
about the state of demand they are in, i.e. Ii = L, or Ii = H, ∀i with corresponding
beliefs of bi(Ii = L) = 0 and bi(Ii = H) = 1. With the remaining probability (1 − σ)n
all firms receive uninformative signals and send ø-messages to their competitors. In this
case firms know that no one knows the demand state, i.e. Ii = ø, ∀i and bi(Ii = ø) = ρ.13
Then, for a given symmetric price vector, the ex ante expected profits for firm i in a
high demand period with communication are
Πci(p|H) ≡ (1− Pr{n|n})piH(p(H))/n+ Pr{n|n}piH(p(ø))/n
13For simplicity, I shall use the same notation for information states in all four classes of equilibria,
although in each type of communication equilibrium an information state is defined in a different way.
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whereas in a low demand period one gets
Πci(p|L) ≡ (1− Pr{n|n})piL(p(L))/n+ Pr{n|n}piL(p(ø))/n.
Firms maximize their overall profits EΠLHi (p) ≡ ρΠci(p|H) + (1− ρ)Πci(p|L).
Full communication creates common knowledge and the highest possible degree of
coordination among firms. More importantly, full equilibrium communication also im-
plies that the on-schedule price deviation constraints are being replaced by the incentive
constraints for communication. In other words, if it is incentive-compatible to report a
H- or L-signal, deviations to the equilibrium price for an uninformative signal become
off-schedule and detectable. This means that firms do not need to take into account
on-schedule constraints when they devise the most collusive pricing strategy. However,
the optimal price vector must provide incentives to communicate truthfully and resist
off-schedule constraints.
Lemma 5 The price vector maximizing firms’ ex ante profits with full communication
is given by pc(I) = (p∗L, pc(ø), p∗H) where pc(ø) is implicitly defined by
(1− ρ)∂pi
L(pc(ø))
∂pc(ø)
+ ρ
∂piH(pc(ø))
∂pc(ø)
= 0 (4)
The optimal price strategy with full communication is straightforward. If at least one
firms receives an informative signal (and communicates), all firms set the complete
information monopoly price for the respective demand state and share the market. If
no firm received a signal, firms share the market at an intermediate price equal to the
ex ante monopoly price without demand signals.
The price vector in Lemma 5 is sustainable if firms have no incentive to deviate at the
communication stage and/or at the pricing stage. The following proposition discusses
the conditions for which this holds true. Denote δc the threshold value above which a
firm would not deviate from its equilibrium price given it is common knowledge that
demand is high.
Proposition 2 If δ ≥ δc, then the price vector pc(I) from Lemma 5 can be supported
in a SPPE with full communication.
At the pricing stage firms have the strongest incentive to deviate in subgames where it
is common knowledge that demand is high, i.e. in subgames following at least one H-
message. Proposition 2 implies that if firms are sufficiently patient not to deviate in these
price subgames then they also have no incentive to deviate at the communication stage.
To see this suppose firm i receives a high demand signal but deviates to a ø-message
and no other firms sends a H-message, then all of the deviating firm’s rivals set the
uninformed price. However, undercutting this price is less profitable than undercutting
the high demand monopoly price and for δ ≥ δc undercutting is always dominated by
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setting the uninformed price. Thus, the deviating firm is better off sending a H-message
at the communication stage and share the market at the monopoly price. A similar
argument applies to the communication incentives of L-signal firms who are for δ ≥ δc
always better off sharing the market at the monopoly price and continuing to collude
rather than not informing their rivals and undercutting them to the monopoly level.
5 Collusion with Partial Communication
5.1 Collusion with Communication in High Demand States
I refer to equilibria with partial communication as situations where firms communicate
in one state of demand but not in the other. As it turns out the analysis of the previous
two sections greatly simplifies these intermediate cases of communication. First consider
the class of equilibria in which firms only communicate if they receive a high demand
signal, i.e. µi(H) = H ∧ µi(L) = µi(ø) = ø.
Following the communication stage, there are two types of price subgames and firms
can be in one of three information states. With an ex ante probability of ρ(1− (1−σ)n)
at least one firm receives a H-signal, communicates it and firms have common knowledge
that they are in a high-demand period, i.e. Ii = H ∀i and bi(Ii = H) = 1. With the
remaining probability all firms receive either a L- or a ø-signal and send uninformative
messages. In this subgame a firm with a L-signal has private information that demand
is low, i.e. Ii = L and bi(Ii = L) = 0. Firms receiving an uninformative private signal
and ø-messages from all other firms (Ii = ø) update their belief according to
bi(Ii = ø) = ρ(1− σ)
n−1
1− ρ+ ρ(1− σ)n−1 .
Note that with this definition of the information states and the equilibrium communi-
cation behavior, firms’ ex ante expected profits in a low demand state without commu-
nication are the same as in section 3, i.e. Πøi (p|L) and the expected profits in a high
demand state are the same as in section 4.14 Therefore, firms maximize their expected
overall profits of EΠHi (p) ≡ ρΠci(p|H) + (1− ρ)Πøi (p|L).
Lemma 6 The price vector that maximizes ex ante expected profits with partial commu-
nication in high demand states is given by pc(I) from Lemma 5.
The optimal organization of collusion with partial communication in high demand states
is the same - modulo the definition of the information states - as under full communica-
tion. Two observations explain this equivalence result. First, the expected profits in low
14In equilibrium p(ø) and p(L) only occur in the price subgame following ø-messages while p(H) is
exclusively chosen in the price subgame following at least one H-message. Therefore, maximizing ex
ante and interim (i.e. after communication) expected profits is equivalent and for expositional reasons
I shall use the former.
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demand states are the same with and without communication as long as p(L) ≤ p(ø). To
see this, note that p(L) becomes the effective industry price in both situations if at least
one firm receives a L-signal, otherwise the industry price is p(ø). With communication,
all firms share the market evenly in every low demand period; without communication,
all firms with a L-signal share the market by undercutting their uninformed rivals. How-
ever, given that signals are uncorrelated across firms and period, each firm has the same
probability of being in this winning fraction of firms. In other words, without com-
munication in low demand states, firms share the market stochastically over time and
this stochastic market sharing is a perfect substitute for communication. Therefore, the
objective of the maximization problem is the same as with full communication.
Secondly, and as detailed in the previous section, communication eliminates on-
schedule and partially off-schedule constraints. If it is (in equilibrium) incentive com-
patible to communicate in high demand states then any deviation from p(H) at the
price stage becomes detectable. Therefore, provided communication incentives, firms
can drop the on-schedule constraint (OS-H) and maximize EΠHi (p) subject to off-
schedule deviations, the partially off-schedule deviation from p(ø) to p(L) and the on-
schedule constraint for L-signal firms, (OS-L). It follows, however, from Lemma 5 that
pc(ø) > pc(L) = p∗(L), i.e. (OS-L) is not binding and sufficiently patient firms can
achieve the unconstrained maximum. Thus, the lemma follows and it remains to verify
the communication incentives.
Proposition 3 If δ ≥ max{δc, δc(ø)}, then pc(I) is sustainable in a SPPE with partial
communication in high demand states.
The two conditions that place lower bounds on the threshold discount factor follow from
the pricing stage. Like in the equilibrium with full communication, the discount factor
has to be sufficiently high to prevent undercutting after high demand communication
(δ ≥ δc). In contrast to the full communication case, here, firms also have to account for
the partially off-schedule deviation of a firm in information state Ii = ø to pc(L). This
deviation is attractive since the absence of a high demand message means that firms
believe stronger that demand is actually low. It is shown in the appendix that δc(ø)
is the binding threshold whenever bi(Ii = ø) is sufficiently small. Then, collusion with
partial communication is harder to sustain than with full communication.
As long as the two conditions on the discount factor in Proposition 3 hold, firms also
have the incentive to send H-messages at the communication stage. The argument is
similar to the previous section. Given a price deviation from a common knowledge high
demand state is not profitable for sufficiently patient firms, firms prefer to inform rivals
about high demand rather than sharing the market with uninformed firms at the price
stage.
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5.2 Collusion with Communication in Low Demand States
Finally consider equilibria where firms report a low demand signal but not a high demand
signal. After the communication stage, there are two types of price subgames on the
equilibrium path. With an ex ante probability of (1− ρ)(1− (1− σ)n) at least one firm
receives a L-signal, communicates it and firms have common knowledge that they are
in a low-demand period, i.e. Ii = L ∀i. With the remaining probability all firms receive
either an H- or ø-signal and send uninformative messages. A firm with a H-signal has
private information that demand is high (Ii = H) while after an uninformative private
signal and ø-messages from all other firms (Ii = ø), firm i updates its belief according
to
bi(Ii = ø) = ρ
ρ+ (1− ρ)(1− σ)n−1 .
Ex ante expected profits in high demand states without communication are as defined
in section 3 and profits in low demand states with communication are as in section 4.
Thus, with partial communication in low demand states, firms maximize
EΠLi (p) ≡ ρΠøi (p|H) + (1− ρ)Πci(p|L).
Equilibrium communication in low demand states eliminates the on-schedule constraint
for L-signal firms and the partially off-schedule constraint for deviations from p(ø) to
p(L). Hence, firms maximize their expected profits subject to (OS-H), off-schedule
deviations and the partially off-schedule deviation from p(ø) to p(H).
Proposition 4 Suppose δ is sufficiently close to 1. If (2) holds, the most collusive SPPE
with partial communication in low demand states is given by Lemma 1. Otherwise, the
most collusive SPPE is given by Lemma 4.
This second equivalence result follows from a similar argument to the one in the previous
section. Modulo the definition of the information states and for given communication
in low demand states, sufficiently patient firms de facto solve the same maximization
problem as without communication. Due to the possibility of stochastic market sharing,
communication cannot improve firms’ expected profits in low demand states and the
objectives of the maximization problems are the same. And while in the absence of
communication firms have to take into account two more constraints, (OS-L) and (POF)
for deviation to p(L), both of these constraints are actually not binding in the optimal
solution of section 3. Therefore, partially communicating firms optimally recur - if
required - to the same organization of collusion, i.e. the use of price wars and price
distortions, to prevent on-schedule deviations from H-signal firms.
Finally, to see that firms have indeed incentives to communicate L-signals, a similar
argument to the case with full communication applies. Sufficiently patient firms prefer
to communicate and share the market at the low demand monopoly price rather than
undercutting uninformed rivals and end collusion or sharing the market at the higher
uninformed price level.
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6 The Value of Communication
Denote the optimal expected, discounted profits with full, partial and no communication
as V LH , V H , V L and V ø respectively.
Proposition 5 For sufficiently patient firms, it holds that
V ø = V L < V H = V LH (i)
and
p∗L < p
c(ø) < pø(ø) < p∗H (ii)
The two equalities in part (i) of Proposition 5 summarize the main results of the previ-
ous sections. Firms do not require communication in low demand states if they rely
on stochastic market sharing. As a consequence partial communication in the low
demand state cannot improve on the equilibrium without communication and partial
communication in high demand states achieves the same profit as full communication.
Communication in high demand states is valuable to firms for three reasons. First,
communication makes on-schedule deviations for firms with high demand signals im-
possible and firms do not need to recur to costly price wars and price distortions to
ensure incentive compatibility. To see the two other gains from communication define
piø(p(ø)) = ρpiH(p(ø))/n+ (1− ρ)piL(p(ø))/n as the expected profit of a firm at the un-
informed price p(ø) in the absence of any demand information. Then take the difference
between expected profits with full communication and without communication (at the
unconstrained maximum) and re-arrange as follows
EΠLHi (p
c)− EΠøi (pø) = EΠLHi (pø)− EΠøi (pø)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gains from coordination
+(1− σ)n(piø(pc(ø))− piø(pø(ø)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
gains from price adjustment
.
The first term on the RHS is the difference in profits at the (unconstrained) optimal
price vector without communication. At equal prices, stochastic market sharing implies
that firms make the same profits in low demand states with or without communica-
tion and, consequently, this term reduces to the profit difference in high demand states.
Communication in high demand states avoids that uninformed firms undercut informed
firms. Hence, the monopoly outcome is achieved more often with communication (with
probability 1 − (1 − σ)n) than without communication (with probability σn) and the
first term on the RHS can be understood as the gains from coordination in high demand
states. The second term is the effect of adjusting the uninformed price optimally to the
amount of additional information that is available to firms via communication. This
term is positive because from (4)) follows that pc maximizes piø(p(ø)). Without com-
munication, firms anticipate that in high demand periods the uninformed price might
undercut informed firms who set the high demand monopoly price. Therefore, firms
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put relatively more weight on the high demand state and choose a higher uninformed
price compared to full communication (compare (1) and (4)). From this, part (ii) of the
proposition follows.
The above result implies that whether communication facilitates collusion does not
necessarily depend on how much information is exchanged among firms but on the
content of information. For examples, in industries with upward demand shocks (i.e.
low ρ), firms communicate more often if they partially communicate in low demand
states compared to partial communication in high demand states only. Nevertheless,
partial communication in high demand states is more collusive in the sense that it leads
to higher industry profits.
Although competition policy is not explicitly modeled in this framework,15 the above
results invite some comments. In application of the “parallelism plus” rule, competition
authorities require evidence of communication to prosecute collusion. If there is the pos-
sibility that communication might be detected, part (i) of Proposition 5 suggests that
firms would optimally react by either not communicating at all or by communicating in
high demand states only. Thus, on the one hand, the above results reduce the scope of
the “parallelism plus” rule since less evidence is produced. On the other hand, commu-
nication is most likely to occur in high demand states and this might provide helpful
guidance in the search for evidence.
Finally, let me turn to consumer surplus. It is clear that consumer surplus can be
decomposed into the same three components as industry profits and it follows without
further calculations that the coordination effect and the elimination of the on-schedule
constraint via communication are negative for consumers. However, part (ii) of Propo-
sition 5 implies that communication leads to a lower uninformed price and therefore the
price adjustment effect of communication is positive for consumers. Thus, without addi-
tional assumptions on the demand structure, the impact of communication on consumer
surplus cannot be assessed unambiguously. The next section considers this trade-off for
the case of an inelastic demand.
7 An Example: Inelastic Demand
In this section I briefly present the results of the model for a specific demand example
in order to discuss the impact of communication on consumer surplus. Consider an
industry with a unit mass of identical customers each of whom with an inelastic demand
of Dθ(p) = 1 for p ≤ vθ and Dθ(p) = 0 otherwise.16 Assume c < vL < vH and denote
15There are indeed very few papers that consider an active competition authority in a repeated game
context. Notable exceptions are Harrington (2004, 2005) who analyzes the optimal dynamic pricing
behavior of firms under the threat of detection and penalties.
16Other functional forms do not yield closed form solutions for the SPPE without communication. As
usual, one possible interpretation of the inelastic demand assumption is a procurement auction where
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V ≡ vH − vL. The remainder of the model is as before. Define the following threshold
values
ρ¯1 ≡ (vL − c)σ(1− σ
n)
(vL − c)(σ(1− σn) + (1− δ)(σ − σn)) + σV (1− (1− δ(1− σ))σn−1)
ρ¯2 ≡ (vL − c)(1− σ)
n
(vL − c)(1− σ)n + V (1− σn) , V¯ =
(1− σn−1)(vL − c)
σn−1(1− σ)
and adapt the results on the optimal SPPE without communication from section 3 to
the inelastic demand case.
Lemma 7 Assume demand is inelastic. If δ is sufficiently large, then the optimal SPPE
without communication is characterized as follows:
(i) If V ≤ V¯ and ρ ≤ ρ¯1, then p∗∗(ø) = vL, β(Nø = i) = 0, ∀i = 0..n− 1 and
β(Nø = n) =
(1− δ)σn−1(V¯ − V )
δ(1− σ)n−1(vL − c+ ρσnV )
(ii) if V ≥ V¯ and ρ ≤ ρ¯2, then p∗∗(ø) = vL and β(Nø = i) = 0, ∀i;
(iii) otherwise, p∗∗(ø) = vH and β(Nø = i) = 0, ∀i.
The results in Lemma 7 are driven by the fact that the inelastic demand structure makes
expected profits linear in prices. As a consequence, the unconstrained maximizer for the
uninformed price is either p(ø) = vL or p(ø) = vH . The lower price obtains for ρ ≤ ρ¯2,
i.e. for a low probability of high demand and a small difference in willingness-to-pay in
high and low demand. The unconstrained solution holds, if (2) holds, which is the case
for V ≥ V¯ . Part (ii) and part (iii) for V ≥ V¯ of the lemma follow.
For sufficiently high δ and V ≤ V¯ there are two candidate maximizers, price rigidity
and price wars. The linearity of profits implies that the unconstrained solution p(ø) = vH
coincides with the price rigidity solution which is clearly optimal for ρ ≤ ρ¯2. The optimal
price war strategy for sufficiently patient firms includes p(ø) = vL and a price wars after
n uninformed prices. Price wars are more costly if ρ and V are high and comparing
the candidate solutions yields that the price war regime dominates the price rigidity
solution for ρ ≤ ρ¯1 ≤ ρ¯2. Note that for δ towards 1, ρ¯1 converges to ρ¯2, the price
war probability goes to zero and the unconstrained solution obtains for all parameter
values. This equilibrium regime discussion is summarized in Figure 1 where δ is assumed
sufficiently high such that the price war solution is feasible for all values of ρ and V .
the buyer splits the order between suppliers with the same bid.
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Figure 1: SPPE with Inelastic Demand
Next reconsider the most collusive SPPE with (full) communication.
Lemma 8 Assume demand is inelastic. If δ is sufficiently large, then the optimal SPPE
with communication implies that if ρ ≤ ρ¯3 ≡ (vL − c)/(vL − c + V ), then pc(ø) = vL,
otherwise, pc(ø) = vH .
With communication in high demand states, firms optimally choose p(ø) = vH if ρ is
large and the profit margin in high demand states (denominator of ρ¯3) is high relative
to the profit margin in low demand states (numerator).
Since ρ¯3 is larger than the two threshold values on ρ from Lemma 7, the parameter
space in Figure 1 is divided into four regions (I-IV ) with different equilibrium behavior
with and without communication. The last proposition compares consumer surplus with
and without communication in these parameter regions.
Proposition 6 Assume demand is inelastic and δ sufficiently large. For all parameter
values in region II, consumers are strictly better off with communication among firms. In
regions III and IV consumers prefer no communication. In region I they are indifferent.
This result reflects the trade-off between coordination effect, price adjustment effect and
the avoiding of price war with communication in high demand states. To see this note
that with an inelastic demand and monopoly prices for firms in information states H
and L, consumers only make surplus if the uninformed price is at vL while demand is
actually high. It follows that the coordination effect (measured at the optimal price
schedule without communication) is zero whenever pø(ø) = vL, i.e. in region I and II,
and negative otherwise. The price adjustment effect is positive whenever pc(ø) < pø(ø),
which only holds in region II. Otherwise, it is zero. Finally, communication makes
consumers worse off by avoiding price wars in region IV and the proposition follows.
The price adjustment effect of communication dominates the coordination and the price
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war effect for all parameter values in region II. In other words, given firms collude,
consumers are better off with communication among firms if demand uncertainty is high
(ρ intermediate) and the fluctuation (V ) between low and high demand is sufficiently
large.
8 Conclusions
This paper introduces imperfect, private demand signals and communication in the work
of Rotemberg & Saloner (1986) on implicitly colluding oligopolists with fluctuating de-
mand. It is shown that extensive information exchange is not a prerequisite for firms to
implement the first-best collusion profits. In particular, in periods of low demand firms
do not need to communicate at all as long as they rely on stochastic, inter-temporal
market sharing. In high demand periods, however, communication is useful to firms for
three reasons. First, it eliminates the possibility of opportunistic price cuts and thereby
avoids the costly use of price wars and price distortions (price war effect). It increases the
probability that firms achieve the most collusive price by avoiding undercutting from un-
informed firms (coordination effect). And thirdly, without undercutting, the uniformed
price can be adjusted downwards to the level an uninformed monopolist would choose
(price adjustment effect). For consumers the first two effects are negative while the price
adjustment effect is always positive. It is demonstrated that if demand is inelastic, the
latter effect may dominate and consumer might be better off with communication among
colluding firms.
The implications of these results for competition policy are ambiguous. On the one
hand, less need for communication means that less evidence is produced and it is harder
to prosecute firms on the basis of the parallelism plus rule. On the other hand, firms
are more likely to communicate in high demand states and this could potentially guide
competition authorities in their search for evidence.
To conclude let me briefly discuss the robustness of these results with respect to the
modeling choices and sketch two interesting extensions of this framework. The signal
accuracy structure used in the model is specific in the sense that firms are either perfectly
informed or not informed at all. Noise in the demand signal introduces inefficiency in
the firms’ use of stochastic market sharing in an obvious way. Without communication
in low demand states not the best informed firm would serve the market but the firm
with the lowest demand signal. This works against stochastic market sharing and make
communication relatively more profitable. Thus, the effectiveness of stochastic market
sharing as a substitute for communication is limited by the noise in the firms’ signal.
It is also granted that the results depend on the mode of competition. Stochastic,
inter-temporal market sharing is not feasible with quantity setting oligopolists. Further-
more, quantity competition should reduce firms’ incentives to reveal information in high
demand situation because a firm’s deviation is more profitable the lower the demand
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expectations of its rivals. However, the main results should - at least to some extent -
carry over to collusive pricing with capacity constraints like in Staiger & Wolak (1992).
Two potential extensions of this framework stand out. First, it would be interest-
ing to analyze whether firms have incentives to form informational coalitions and to
communicate only within a small group of firms. Firms would have to trade off less
information within their coalition with a higher market share in case their competitors
remain uninformed. And, second, for communicating firms, demand information is a
public good and it seems worthwhile to study if and under which circumstances firms
actually have incentives to gather information and how this in turn affects their ability
to collude.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3
Suppose p(L) ≤ p(ø) ≤ p(H) and denote the RHS of (OSH-1) as
∆(p) ≡ 1− σ
n
1− σ pi
H(p(ø))/n− σn−1piH(p(H))/n
and the LHS as
δ
1− δZ(β)EΠ
ø
i (p) ≡
δ
1− δ
n−1∑
j=0
Pr{j|n− 1}(βj+1 − βj)EΠøi (p).
Then the Lagrangian of this reduced maximization problem can be written as
L = EΠøi (p(I)) + (1− ρ)
δ
1− δEΠ
ø
i (p(I)) + ρ
δ
1− δEΠ
ø
i (p(I))
n∑
j=0
Pr{j|n}(1− βj)
+ λ[
δ
1− δZ(β)EΠ
ø
i (p)−∆(p)] +
n∑
j=0
λ0jβj +
n∑
j=0
λ1j (1− βj)
=
EΠøi (p(I))
1− δ (1− ρδ
n∑
j=0
Pr{j|n}βj) + λ[ δ1− δZ(β)EΠ
ø
i (p)−∆(p)]
+
n∑
j=0
λ0jβj +
n∑
j=0
λ1j (1− βj).
The Kuhn-Tucker condition for βj is given by, (K-1),
∂L
∂βj
= −ρ δ
1− δPr{j|n}EΠ
ø
i + λ
δ
1− δ [Pr{j − 1|n− 1} − Pr{j|n− 1}]EΠ
ø
i + λ
0
j − λ1j = 0.
Complementary slackness requires that λ0jβj = 0, λ
0
j ≥ 0, λ1j (1 − βj) = 0 and λ1j ≥ 0, ∀j. It
is straightforward to check that λ0j = 0 and λ
1
j > 0, i.e. βj = 1, if λ > Γ(j) where Γ(j) is
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defined as in the text. It also follows that λ0j = λ
1
j ≥ 0, i.e. βj ∈ [0, 1], if λ = Γ(j). Γ(j) can be
simplified to Γ(j) = ρnσ(1−σ)/[j−n(1−σ)] and since ∂Γ(j)/∂j = −Γ(j)/(j−n(1−σ)) < 0,
the lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 4
Define Φ(β) =
∑n
j=0 Pr{j|n}βj . The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given by
∂L
∂p(L)
=
1− ρδΦ(β)
1− δ
∂EΠøi
∂p(L)
+ λ
δ
1− δZ(β)
∂EΠøi
∂p(L)
= 0, (K-2)
∂L
∂p(H)
=
1− ρδΦ(β)
1− δ
∂EΠøi
∂p(H)
+ λ
∂∆
∂p(H)
+ λ
δ
1− δZ(β)
∂EΠøi
∂p(H)
= 0, (K-3)
∂L
∂p(ø)
=
1− ρδΦ(β)
1− δ
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø)
+ λ(
δ
1− δZ(β)
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø)
− ∂∆
∂p(ø)
) = 0, (K-4)
λ[
δ
1− δZ(β)EΠ
ø
i −∆(p)] = 0, λ ≥ 0. (K-5)
From ∂EΠøi /∂p(L) = [(1− ρ)(1− (1− σ)n)/n]∂piLi /∂p(L) and (K-2) follows p(L) = p∗L. From
∂EΠøi /∂p(H) = [ρσ
n/n]∂piHi /∂p(H) and ∂∆/∂p(H) = [−σn−1/n]∂piHi /∂p(H) and (K-3) fol-
lows p(H) = p∗H .
Equations (K-4) and (K-5) determine p(ø) and λ taking into account that the optimal price
war vector β is a function of λ. According to Lemma 3 there are three different optimal regimes
of price wars: the interior solution, the corner solution and the solution with price distortions
only.
1. Interior solution. Consider situations in which λ = Γ(j), ∀j with n(1 − σ) < j ≤ n. In
this solution it has to hold that βj ∈ [0, 1] while βk = 1, ∀k, j < k ≤ n. Thus,
Z(β) = Pr{j|n− 1}+ βj [Pr{j − 1|n− 1} − Pr{j|n− 1}]
and
Φ(β) = Pr{j|n}βj +
n∑
i=j+1
Pr{i|n}.
In this regime, the equilibrium price p(ø) is derived from (K-4) while βj is determined from
(K-4) given p(ø). I first analyze (K-4) and show that (i) dp(ø)/dδ > 0 and d2p(ø)/(dδ)2 < 0.
Then I use these results to derive from (K-5) that (ii) ∀j there exists an interval Ij = [δj , δj ]
such that βj ∈ [0, 1] if δ ∈ Ij . Finally, I show that (iii) δj < 1 for all j < n and that δn = 1.
(i) Rewrite (K-4), group all terms with βj ,
δ
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø)
βj [λ(Pr{j − 1|n− 1} − Pr{j|n− 1})− ρPr{j|n}]
+ (1− ρδΦ(0))∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
− λ((1− δ) ∂∆
∂p(ø)
− δZ(0)∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
) = 0.
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Note that the first term is zero since the expression in the bracket is zero for λ = Γ(j). Further
define Ψ ≡ λZ(0)− ρΦ(0), Then, (K-4) reduces to
(1 + δΨ)
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø)
− (1− δ)λ ∂∆
∂p(ø)
= 0. (K-4’)
Note that Ψ is positive if
Pr{j|n− 1}Pr{j|n}
(Pr{j − 1|n− 1} − Pr{j|n− 1}) ≥
n∑
i=j+1
Pr{i|n}.
The RHS and LHS of this inequality are equal to 0 at j = n. Take the first differences
∆RHS(j) ≡ RHS(j − 1) − RHS(j) and ∆LHS(j) ≡ LHS(j − 1) − LHS(j). Verify that
∆LHS(j)/∆RHS(j) > 1 if
jσ
(j − n(1− σ))(j − 1− n(1− σ)) > 0
which always holds for n(1 − σ) < j ≤ n. From Ψ > 0, (K-4’) and p(ø) < p(H) = p∗H follows
∂∆/∂p(ø) > 0 and ∂EΠøi /∂p(ø) > 0. Then totally differentiate (K-4’) to derive
dp(ø)
dδ
= −
Ψ∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø) + λ
∂∆
∂p(ø)
(1 + δΨ) ∂
2EΠøi
(∂p(ø))2
− (1− δ)λ ∂2∆
(∂p(ø))2
> 0
To ensure concavity of the maximization problem we have to assume that the denominator
is negative (which holds if δ is sufficiently high). The numerator is positive and the positive
overall sign follows. Denote the numerator of dp(ø)/dδ as f and the negative of the denominator
as g. Then the second derivative is d2p(ø)/(dδ)2 = [g (∂f/∂δ)− f (∂g/∂δ)]/g2 where
(g ∂f/∂δ − f ∂g/∂δ) = g∂p(ø)
∂δ
f − f(−Ψ ∂
2EΠøi
(∂p(ø))2
− λ ∂
2∆
(∂p(ø))2
+ g
∂p(ø)
∂δ
)
= f(Ψ
∂2EΠøi
(∂p(ø))2
+ λ
∂2∆
(∂p(ø))2
) < 0
and therefore d2p(ø)/(dδ)2 < 0.
(ii) The optimal interior βj for a given p(ø) is implicitly defined from (K-5) by
Ω ≡ (1− δ)∆(p)− δZ(β)EΠøi = 0.
Note that Ω(δ = 0) > 0 and Ω(δ = 1) < 0. Thus, if Ω is concave in δ for all δ ∈ [0, 1], then
there exists a unique value δˆj(βj) for which Ω = 0. The first derivative is
dΩ
dδ
= −∆(p)− Z(β)EΠøi +
∂p(ø)
∂δ
[(1− δ) ∂∆
∂p(ø)
− δZ(β)∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
]
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and the second derivative is
d2Ω
(dδ)2
=− ∂∆
∂p(ø)
∂p(ø)
∂δ
− Z(β)∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
∂p(ø)
∂δ
+ [(1− δ) ∂∆
∂p(ø)
− δZ(β)∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
]
∂2p(ø)
(∂δ)2
+
∂[(1− δ) ∂∆∂p(ø) − δZ(β)
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø) ]
∂δ
∂p(ø)
∂δ
.
Note that by (K-4) the expression in the bracket of the last term in the first derivative is
always positive. Thus, the first three summands of the second derivative are negative. From
(K-4) also follows that the bracketed expression is equivalent to [∂EΠøi /∂p(ø)](1− ρδΦ(β))/λ.
The first derivative of this expression with respect to p(ø) is always negative and therefore the
fourth term in the second derivative is negative. It follows that Ω is concave and δˆj(βj) is the
unique value for which Ω = 0. Furthermore, it follows that the slope of Ω at δ = δˆj is negative.
Then, taking the total differential of Ω yields
dδˆj
dβj
= − ∂Ω/∂βj
∂Ω/∂δ|δ=δˆj
< 0
since the numerator is −δ(Z(1) − Z(0))EΠøi < 0. From this and the uniqueness of δˆj follows
directly that there exists for each j an interval [δˆj(βj = 1), δˆj(βj = 0)] in which an interior
solution is feasible.
(iii) Finally check that Ω(βj = 0, δ = 1) = −δZ(0)EΠøi < 0 and so δˆj(βj = 0) < 1 for all
j < n. And since Z(0) = Pr{j = n|n − 1} = 0 it follows that δˆj(βj = 0) = 1 for j = n.
Consequently, for δ sufficiently high, the only feasible interior solution is the one described in
the lemma.
2. Corner solutions. I now show that corner solutions Γ(j) < λ < Γ(j − 1), for all j,
n(1− σ) < j ≤ n+ 1, are not feasible for δ sufficiently close to 1. In corner solution j it holds
that βi = 1, ∀i ≥ j, and βi = 0 otherwise. The price p(ø) is determined by (K-5) while λ
adjusts for given p(ø) to satisfy (K-4), i.e.
λ =
∂EΠøi /∂p(ø)(1− ρδΦ(1))
(1− δ)∂∆/∂p(ø)− δZ(1)∂EΠøi /∂p(ø)
.
It is straightforward to verify that numerator and denominator have opposite signs if δ ap-
proaches 1. Thus λ becomes negative and the solution not feasible. In fact, for p(ø) ≤ p(H) =
p∗H , we have that ∆/∂p(ø) > 0 and ∂EΠ
ø
i /∂p(ø) > 0. From the denominator follows that there
exists an asymptote δ′ < 1 at which λ goes to infinity. Hence, a necessary condition for all
corner solutions to hold is that δ is smaller than δ′.
3. No price wars solution. Suppose 0 < λ < Γ(n) = ρ(1 − σ). Without price wars
Z(β) = Φ(β) = 0, p(ø) solves (K-5) and λ obtains from (K-4),
λ =
∂EΠøi /∂p(ø)
(1− δ)∂∆/∂p(ø) .
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As δ approaches 1, λ goes to infinity and the solution is not feasible.
This completes the proof of point (i) in the lemma. To show the remaining parts, consider
(K-4) for λ = Γ(n) = ρ(1−σ). Check that Z(β) = Pr{n|n}βn and Φ(β) = Pr{n−1|n−1}βn,
then (K-4) can be written as
(1− ρδ(1− σ)nβn)∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
− λ(1− δ) ∂∆
∂p(ø)
+ λδ(1− σ)n−1βn∂EΠ
ø
i
∂p(ø)
= 0.
After substituting in λ = ρ(1− σ), βn cancels out and the condition reduces to
∂EΠøi
∂p(ø)
− ρ(1− σ)(1− δ) ∂∆
∂p(ø)
= 0,
(1− ρ)(1− σ)n∂pi
L(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
+ ρ(1− σn)∂pi
H(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
− (1− δ)ρ(1− σn)∂pi
H(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
= 0,
(1− ρ)(1− σ)n∂pi
L(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
+ δρ(1− σn)∂pi
H(p∗(ø))
∂p∗(ø)
= 0.
For δ = 1 this condition coincides with the condition for the unconstrained solution (1). For
smaller δ there is less weight on the marginal profits in a high demand state and the resulting
optimal p∗∗(ø) is smaller than the unconstrained price p∗∗(ø). At the same time, for any δ > 0,
the optimal price p∗∗(ø) is larger than the low-demand monopoly price. Point (iv) in the lemma
follows directly from plugging p∗∗(ø) > p∗L into the on-schedule constraint for L-signal firms in
the absence of price wars
1− (1− σ)n
σn
piL(p∗L) ≥
(1− σ)n−1
n
piL(p∗∗(ø))
which always holds since [1− σ − (1− σ)n]/[n(1− σ)σ] > 0 and piL(p∗L) > piL(p∗∗(ø)).
Proof of Proposition 2
After the communication stage there are three possible types of price subgames on the equi-
librium path. Consider the price subgame following a verified message mi = H of at least one
firm. Firms charge the equilibrium price pc(H) if
δV LH ≥ (n− 1)
n
piH(pc(H)) (5)
where V LH ≡ EΠLHi (pc(I))/(1− δ). With at least one L message, firms stick to their equilib-
rium price pc(L) if
δV LH ≥ (n− 1)
n
piL(pc(L)). (6)
If all firms receive uninformative signals and messages, firms set pc(ø) if
ρpiL(pc(ø)) + (1− ρ)piH(pc(ø))
n
+ δV LH ≥ ρpiL(pc(ø)) + (1− ρ)piH(pc(ø)). (7)
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Clearly, (5) implies (6) and (7) and thus yields δc. After out-of-equilibrium outcomes of the
communication stage, firms revert to marginal cost pricing from the current period onwards.
Then, at the communication stage, ø-signal firms always truthfully report their signal. Suppose
firm i receives a H-signal and deviates to mi = ø. If no other firm receives an informative
signal, all remaining firms j ∈ N, j 6= i are in information state Ij = ø and set price pc(ø). The
best deviation for firm i is pc(ø)− ². However, this deviation is always dominated for δ ≥ δc.
This means that at the communication stage firm i with a H−signal sending mi = ø expects
(1− σ)n−1(pi
H(pc(ø))
n
+ δV LH) + (1− (1− σ)n−1)(pi
H(pc(H))
n
+ δV LH)
which is strictly dominated by sending mi = H and receiving piH(pc(H))/n+ δV LH . If firm i
with a L−signal deviates to mi = ø and no other firm sends a L− message, it either prefers to
play p(ø) and have a positive continuation value or undercut all firms with p∗L. The expected
profit is thus
(1− σ)n−1Max{pi
L(pc(ø))
n
+ δV LH ;piL(pc(L))}+ (1− (1− σ)n−1)(pi
L(pc(L))
n
+ δV LH)
which is for δ ≥ δc and either value of the Max bracket always dominated by sending mi = L
and receiving piL(pc(L))/n+ δV LH .
Proof of Proposition 3
First consider the price setting stage on the equilibrium path and define V H ≡ EΠHi (pc(I))/(1−
δ) = V LH . Suppose there was at least one H-message. Then firms set the equilibrium price
pc(H) if δ ≥ δc. Second, suppose all firms sent uninformative messages. A firm with a L-signal
has no incentive to deviate if and only if δ ≥ δc. A firm with a ø-signal has an updated belief
of bi(ø) and expects equilibrium profits of
bi(ø)
piH(pc(ø))
n
+ (1− bi(ø))(1− σ)n−1pi
L(pc(ø))
n
+ δV H .
Consider profitable deviations for this firm given its rivals either set pc(L) or pc(ø). The
partially on-schedule deviation to pc(L) yields
bi(ø)ΠH(pc(L)) + (1− bi(ø))[1− (1− σ)
n
σn
ΠL(pc(L)) + δV H ].
This deviation is not profitable if
δV H ≥bi(ø)[piH(pc(L))− pi
H(pc(ø))
n
] (8)
+ (1− bi(ø))[1− (1− σ)
n
σn
piL(pc(L))− (1− σ)n−1pi
L(pc(ø))
n
+ δV H ]
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To show that (5) might be more restrictive than (8), compare their respective RHS for bi(ø)→
1. The RHS of (5) is larger since
piH(pc(H))− piH(pc(L)) ≥ pi
H(pc(H))
n
− pi
H(pc(ø))
n
and pc(L) = p∗L ≤ pc(ø) ≤ pc(H) = p∗H . To show that (5) might be more restrictive than
(8), note that for bi(ø) → 0, the RHS of (8) goes to infinity for δ → 1. Two more possible
price deviation for a ø-signal firm need to be checked. First, deviating to pc(L) − ² yields
bi(ø)piH(pc(L))+ (1− bi(ø))piL(pc(L)), which, for δ ≥ δc, is always dominated by the deviation
to pc(L). Secondly, deviating to a pd with pc(L) < pd < pc(ø) gives
bi(ø)piH(pd) + (1− bi(ø))(1− σ)n−1piL(pd)
Maximizing with respect to pd yields the same condition as (4) from Lemma 5, i.e. pd =
pc(ø)− ². Setting the equilibrium price pc(ø) dominates this deviation if
δV H ≥ bi(ø)n− 1
n
piH(pc(ø)) + (1− bi(ø))(1− σ)n−1n− 1
n
piL(pc(ø))
which always holds for δ ≥ δc. The only (potentially) profitable deviation at the communication
stage is for a H-signal to announce mi = ø. In this case, with probability 1 − (1 − σ)n−1 at
least one other firm sends a H-message and, for δ ≥ δc, the deviating firm cannot do better
than setting pc(H) and receiving equilibrium profits. With probability (1 − σ)n−1 no other
firm receives a H-signal, only uninformative messages are sent and the deviating firm knows
that all of its rivals got a ø-signal and set pc(ø). At this point setting pc(ø) dominates the best
deviation to pc(ø)−² for δ ≥ δc. However, the maximum deviation profit of piH(pc(ø))/n+δV H
is strictly less than the equilibrium profits with mi = H and the proposition follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4
I show that firms have an incentive to communicate in low demand states for sufficiently high δ.
It is straightforward to show that off-schedule deviations at the pricing stage never occur with
sufficiently patient firms. In the subgames in which all firms send uninformative messages, a
firm with a ø-signal also has to resist the partially off-schedule deviation to p∗∗(H) = p∗H , i.e.
it has to hold that
bi(ø)[
1− σn
n(1− σ)pi
H(p(ø)) + δV L(1− (1− σ)n−1βn)] + (1− bi(ø))[ 1− σ
n
n(1− σ)pi
L(p(ø)) + δV L]
≥ bi(ø)[σ
n−1
n
piH(p∗∗(H)) + δV L]
where V L is the maximal expected, discounted continuation value. Note that the difference
between the first bracket on the LHS and the bracket on the RHS is identical to the constraint
(OSH-1). Since (OSH-1) holds with equality the brackets cancel out and the condition always
holds. Now consider the communication stage. If firm i receives a L-signal and deviates by
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announcing mi = ø, then with probability 1 − (1 − σ)n−1 at least one other firm receives a
L-signal and sends a L-message. This means all firms are in information state Ii = L and
sufficiently patient firms do not deviate from p∗∗(L). With probability (1 − σ)n−1 no other
firm receives a L-signal, only uninformative messages are sent and firms set p∗∗(ø). At this
point, a price deviation is never profitable if piL(p∗∗(ø))/n + δV L ≥ piL(p∗∗(L)) which always
holds for sufficiently patient firms. Therefore sending a L-message at the communication stage
dominates sending mi = ø since
piL(p∗∗(L))
n
+ δV L ≥ (1− σ)n−1pi
L(p∗∗(ø))
n
+ (1− (1− σ)n−1)pi
L(p∗∗(L))
n
+ δV L
for p∗∗(L) = p∗L < p
∗∗(ø). The proposition follows. 
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